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Abstract Abstrak
Labour law does not always provide 
a satisfactory answer to the issue on 
the protection of workers’ or employees’ 
interests. Modern corporate law gives an 
alternative way in promoting the interests 
of employees; whereby it obliges directors 
to take into account not only shareholders’ 
but also employees’ interests in decision-
making process.
Hukum perburuhan tidak selalu memuas- 
kan dalam melindungi kepentingan buruh 
atau pegawai perusahaan. Hukum per-
usahaan yang modern memberikan 
alternatif untuk memajukan kepentingan 
para pegawai perusahaan, di mana ia 
menentukan agar direktur dalam mengemban 
tugasnya pada perusahaan, tidak hanya 
memperhatikan kepentingan pemegang 
saham tetapi juga harus memperhatikan 
kepentingan pegawai dalam proses 
pengambilan keputusan.
Keywords: employee, labour, director, ESOP, co-determination.
a. Introduction
Directors of corporations play a 
significant role in the area of corporate 
governance. This is because all managerial 
powers in corporations are vested to the 
directors. It can be understood, therefore, if 
director’s duty to the corporation becomes 
an important issue in the discussion of 
corporate governance, in which it has 
been discussed by many authors in many 
countries.1 Managerial powers exercised by 
directors, however, are not their own. For 
who are those powers exercised? This issue 
had been an academic and applied debate in 
the United States since eighty years ago.
In the early 1930s, a series of three 
articles published in the Harvard Law 
Review by Professors Berle and Dodd 
set out two models of corporations: 
the shareholder-focused model and the 
stakeholder-focused model. Although the 
debate between Professors Berle and Dodd 
was about American corporations and took 
place eighty years ago, “it remains highly 
pertinent for application in other countries 
and in other corporate contexts due to the 
*  Lecturer on International Trade Law at Graduate Program Faculty of Law Universitas Muhammadiyah Jakarta 
(e-mail: hesty.lestari@gmail.com).
1 Klaus J. Hopt, “Director’s Duties to Shareholders, Employees, and Other Creditors: A View from the Continent”, 
in McKendrick (ed.), 1992, Commercial Aspects of Trusts and Fiduciary Obligations, Oxford University Press, 
New York, p. 115.
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ubiquitous nature of the choice of the two 
models.”2
Professor Berle’s article appeared 
first. He argued that “all powers granted 
to a corporation or to the management of 
a corporation, or to any group within the 
corporation, whether derived from statute 
or charter or both, are necessarily and at 
all times exercisable only for the rateable 
benefit of all the shareholders as their 
interests appear.”3 Berle stated that his 
proposition could be supported by analysing 
five absolute corporate powers, such as the 
power to issue stock and the power to declare 
or withhold dividends, in which the result of 
it was these powers were exercised only for 
the interests of shareholders.
A year after the publication of Pro- 
fessor Berle’s article, Professor Dodd wrote 
in response. Dodd disagreed with Berle’s 
thesis and claimed that managers ‘should 
concern themselves with the interests of 
employees, consumers, and the general 
public, as well as of the stockholders’.4 Dodd 
asserted that it was common at that time 
to use corporate funds to suggest ‘a social 
responsibility rather than an exclusively 
profit making viewpoint’. He acknow- 
ledged that such charity was not the duty of 
the board, but by referring to the judgment 
of Hutton v. West Cork Ry,5 he stated that 
so long as the charity was required for the 
benefit of the company, it was acceptable. 
He believed that by considering the welfare 
of employees and consumers, the profits 
of stockholders would increase in the long 
run.6
In his reaction, Berle declared that 
social responsibility, although it was 
justified, was theory, not practice.7 He 
contended that there was no mechanism 
for enforcing social responsibility, and 
that stockholders’ interests should not be 
weakened except for “a clear and reasona-
bly enforceable scheme of responsibilities 
to someone else”.8 Twenty years later, Berle 
acknowledged that the debate had “been 
settled (at least for the time being) squarely 
in favour of Professor Dodd’s contention,” 
but, in spite of that fact, he rejected 
the assumption that Dodd was right all 
along.9
The effect of this famous debate 
has changed corporate doctrine from the 
traditional view as Berle’s proposition to 
Dodd’s that corporation is not merely an 
aggregate of its shareholders but it includes 
a range of other interests, which are the 
2  Andrew Clarke, “The Models of the Corporation and the Development of Corporate Governance”, Corporate 
Governance eJournal, September, 2005. J. Parkinson, 1993, Corporate Power and Responsibility: Issues in the 
Theory of Company Law, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
3 Adolf A. Berle, “Corporate Powers as Powers in Trust”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 44, 1931, p. 1049.
4  E. Merrick Dodd, “For Whom Are Corporate Managers Trustees?”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 45, 1932, 
p. 1156.
5  Hutton v. West Cork Ry (1883) 23 Ch. D. 654 at 673: “The law does not say that there are to be no cakes and ale, 
but there are to be no cakes and ale except such as is required for the benefit of the company.”
6  E. Merrick Dodd, 1932, Loc.cit.
7  Adolf A. Berle, “For Whom Corporate Managers Are Trustees: A Note”, Harvard Law Review, Vol. 45, 1932, 
p. 1367.
8  Ibid.
9  Joseph L. Weiner, “The Berle-Dodd Dialogue on the Concept of the Corporation”, Columbia Law Review, 
Vol. 64, 1964, p. 1464.
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interests of employees, customers and 
creditors.10 Furthermore, the development 
of the concept of corporation gives a 
substantial effect to define director’s duties, 
which is directors owe duty not only to 
shareholders, but they have a duty to consider 
the interests of employees, customers and 
creditors in certain circumstances as well.11
This article will focus on the discussion 
of directors’ duty to take into account the 
interest of employees in their business 
decisions. In this regard, employees should 
include white collar employees and workers 
(labours) as well. Promoting the employees’ 
interest is a problematic issue since this 
interest is usually placed in the opposite 
position from that of the corporation in- 
terest. It is not unusual if directors set aside 
the interest of employees in order to pursue 
the interest of the corporation. Labour 
law is not always successful in protecting 
the interest of employees. Accordingly, 
approaching this issue with corporate law 
suggests a solution in promoting the interest 
of employees.
The problem which will be dealt with 
in this article is that Indonesian corporate 
law does not recognise director’s duty to 
employees. It is questionable therefore, 
whether directors should be imposed a duty 
to employees under Indonesian corporate 
law. Since similar situation is also faced by 
Australian corporate law, this article will 
compare the legal development in attri- 
buting the employees’ interest into the 
interests of the company as a whole under 
Indonesian and Australian corporate laws 
and practical approaches taken by Indone-
sian and Australian companies in dealing 
with this issue. This article will also explore 
the role of employees in German corporate 
governance, the possibility of incorporating 
the formal recognition of employees into 
Indonesian corporate governance and some 
controversial issues when applying this 
rule, such as conflict of interests between 
shareholder’s interest and employee’s 
interest.
B.  analysis
1.  legal development
a)  Indonesian law 
The current law that governs 
corporations is Act Number 40 of 2007 
concerning Limited Liability Companies 
(Undang-Undang tentang Perseroan 
Terbatas or UUPT). The UUPT does not 
provide for an express duty of directors to 
take into account the interest of employees 
in their business decisions. Pursuant to 
Article 97 (2) of the UUPT, the board of 
directors has to exercise its powers and 
discharge its duties in good faith and with 
full responsibility in the interests and 
business of the company. There is no 
explanation in this act on the meaning of 
the interests of the company. It is doubtful 
that the interest of employees is within the 
meaning of the interests of the company 
under this provision.
Article 126 (1) of the UUPT requires 
mergers, consolidations, acquisitions and 
10 Jennifer G. Hill, “Corporate Governance and the Role of the Employee”, in Patmore and Golan (eds.), 2003, 
Partnership at Work: The Challenge of Employee Democracy: Labor Law Essays, Pluto Press, Sydney, p. 7.
11  Klaus J. Hopt, 1992, Loc.cit.
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spin offs to take into account the interests of 
company, minority shareholders, employees, 
creditors, trading partners, as well as the 
interests of public and fair competition. The 
persons upon whom this obligation falls 
are not identified. Thus, they could include 
directors, commissioners and shareholders 
of the respective companies. It is interesting 
to note, that this provision separates the 
interest of company from the interest 
of employees. Consequently, under this 
provision the interests of the company do 
not include the interest of employees.
The UUPT also seems reluctant to 
accommodate the interest of employees as 
it is shown in Article 43 (3). This provision 
mentions about the issuance of shares for 
employees or Employee Stock Ownership 
Plans (ESOPs). Nevertheless, it does not 
require the company in certain circumstan-
ces to issue shares for its employees. Thus, 
it is under the discretion of the board of 
directors, as the embodiment of the company, 
whether or not the company may offer its 
shares to its employees.
Attributing the interest of employees 
into the interests of the company as a whole 
also seems difficult considering the nature 
of the corporate structure in Indonesia. 
Based on Article 1 (2) of the UUPT, the 
corporate structure consists of 3 elements: 
the general meeting of shareholders (GMS), 
the board of directors and the board of 
commissioners. As a civil law country, 
Indonesia adopts a two-tier board structure, 
which are the management board (the board 
of directors or Direksi) and the supervisory 
board (the board of commissioners or 
Dewan Komisaris). The GMS has all 
authority and powers not granted to the 
Direksi or Dewan Komisaris within the 
limits of the UUPT or the Articles of 
Association.12 The GMS appoints to the 
Direksi and Dewan Komisaris. The Direksi 
shall carry out the management of the 
company.13 Dewan Komisaris has duties 
to supervise the Direksi in the operation of 
the company and to provide advices for the 
Direksi.
From these provisions it can be seen 
that the UUPT still adopts the traditional 
view of the corporation as an aggregate of 
its shareholders. Through the mechanism of 
the GMS, the shareholders appoint members 
of the Direksi and of Dewan Komisaris. 
The UUPT does not give any chance 
for employees to be represented in the 
corporate structure. At this point, corporate 
law is parallel with labour law, which puts 
employees as outsiders to the corporate 
structure. The nature of the corporate 
structure can reflect to what extent corporate 
law can protect the interest of employees.
Even though the UUPT does not 
impose the duty on directors to take into 
consideration the interest of employees 
in their business decisions, directors are 
under obligation to protect the interest of 
employees based on labour law. Two major 
pieces of Indonesia’s labour legislations are 
Act Number 13 of 2003 concerning Man-
power (Manpower Act) and Act Number 2 
of 2004 concerning the Industrial Relations 
Dispute Settlement (IRDS Act). Indonesia 
12  Article 75 (1) of the UUPT.
13 Article 92 (1) of the UUPT.
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has also ratified numerous ILO conventions 
including all eight of the ILO’s core labour 
conventions, which are:
1. Convention concerning Forced or 
Compulsory Labor;
2. Convention concerning the Abolition 
of Forced Labor;14 
3. Convention concerning Freedom of 
Association and Protection of the 
Right to Organize;15
4. Convention concerning Discrimina-
tion in Respect of Employment and 
Occupation;16
5. Convention concerning the Ap-
plication of the Principles of the 
Right to Organize and to Bargain 
Collectively;17
6. Convention concerning Equal Re-
muneration for Men and Women 
Workers for Work of Equal Value;18
7. Convention concerning Minimum Age 
for Admission to Employment;19 and 
8. Convention concerning the Prohibi-
tion and Immediate Action for the 
Elimination of the Worst Forms of 
Child Labor.20
On paper, labour law in Indonesia has 
provided several protections on employees’ 
interests. The fundamental rights already 
granted to employees include the right to 
organise into trade unions, the right to bargain 
and strike, and the provision of certain 
minimum standards, such as wages, work 
hours, sick leave, maternity leave, holiday 
pay, overtime, and severance pay. Article 
86 of the Manpower Act stipulates that 
employees are entitled to have protections 
in respect of safety, health and morality, the 
promotion of labour morale and treatment 
in accordance with the dignity of mankind 
and religious morals. Pursuant to Article 
151 of the Manpower Act, employers, as 
well as employees and trade unions, must 
make all efforts to prevent the termination 
of employment. The employer must consult 
his/her intention to terminate with the trade 
union or with the non-unionized worker 
directly. If no agreement is reached, then 
the employer must receive permission 
to terminate the employment contract of 
the employee from the institution for the 
settlement of industrial relation disputes 
(ISIRD). If the employee is unwilling to 
accept the dismissal for grave wrongdoings, 
he/she may file a suit to the ISIRD.
The IRDS Act provides five dispute 
settlement procedures: bipartite settlement, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration and 
an Industrial Relations Court. Article 3 
of the IRDS Act stipulates the procedures 
to be taken in the event of a dispute over 
termination of employment. This provision 
requires that industrial disputes first be 
resolved through bipartite bargaining within 
30 days of commencement of negotiations. 
If the negotiations fail, at least one or both 
of the parties can file the dispute to the local 
manpower office, which will offer both 
parties the opportunity to settle the dispute 
14  Act Number 19 of 1999.
15 Presidential Decree Number 83 of 1998.
16 Act Number 21 of 1999.
17 Act Number 1 of 1956.
18  Act Number 80 of 1957.
19 Act Number 20 of 1999.
20 Act Number 1 of 2000.
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through conciliation. Article 5 of the IRDS 
Act states that, should conciliation not yield 
a result, one of the parties can file a legal 
petition to the Industrial Relations Court. If 
the employee wishes to appeal the decision 
of the Industrial Relations Court, he/she 
must file an appeal within seven working 
days to the Supreme Court.21
The text of labour laws is meaningless 
if there is no successful enforcement. 
Despite industrial relations reforms, the 
Indonesian labour law system remains to 
benefit employees only on an occasional 
and arbitrary basis. The reforms reserve 
discretion in the hands of employers and 
the state.22 Although trade unions enjoy 
significant freedoms since the collapse of 
the New Order, they face new and difficult 
challenges. The 1997 economic crisis 
prompted the flight of foreign investors 
and mass unemployment.23 This results an 
extremely vulnerable labour force able to 
be mobilised to keep labour costs low and 
capable of instant replacement in the case of 
a strike or other such disruption.24 Similarly, 
an export-oriented industrialisation strategy 
needs low labour costs in order to compete 
with other Asian states. This produces a 
labour law framework designed to control 
unions and wage demands.25 
Furthermore, under labour law em-
ployees are equal partners of employers. 
This means, labour law deems employees 
are outsiders to corporations.26 As the 
outsiders, however, employees are directed 
to feel as insiders in order to maintain 
and defend the business perpetuity. Even 
though labour law tries to protect the 
interests of employees, a complicated 
and unfair situation is quite often faced 
by employees. In fact, the position of 
corporations is clearly stronger than that of 
employees. 
Perhaps, that is an impact of the defini-
tion of employers given by the Manpower 
Act, which assumes individual, entre-
preneur, legal entities or other entity as the 
same creatures.27 Although the Manpower 
Act does not define employers as corpora-
tions only, it can be found in the commer- 
cial reality that employers tend overwhel-
mingly to be corporations. The Manpower 
Act fails to take into account special features 
and the internal system of a corporation, 
in which employees are an internal part 
of a corporation. It seems, the Manpower 
Act ignores the relevance of corporate law 
for labour law. To be sure, corporate law 
is always relevant for the discussion of 
promoting employees’ interests. 
21 Article 110 of the 2004 Act.
22  Alexandra Owens, “Testing the Ratcheting Labor Standards Proposal: Indonesia and the Shangri-La Workers”, 
Melbourne Journal International Law, Vol. 7, 2004.
23  Aloysius Uwiyono, “Employer’s Perspective of the Present Industrial Relations”, The International Labour 
Organization, Vol. 3, 2000.
24  Tim Lindsey and Teten Masduki, “Labour Law in Indonesia after Suharto: Reformasi or Replay?”, in Sean 
Cooney (ed.), Law and Labour Market Regulation in East Asia, 2002, London and New York.
25  Sean Cooney, “Labour Law and Labour Market Regulation in East Asian States: Problems and Issues for 
Comparative Inquiry”, in Sean Cooney (ed.), 2002, Law and Labour Market Regulation in East Asia, London 
and New York.
26  Jennifer G. Hill, 2003, Op.cit., pp. 2-5.
27 Article 1 (4) of the 2003 Act: employers are individual, entrepreneur, legal entities or other entity that employ 
manpower.
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b)  australian law
Australia adopts common law system; 
accordingly the sources of law in Australia 
are case law and statute. Court decisions 
are binding on lower courts in subsequent 
cases and on the same courts as well. 
Regarding director’s duty to the company, 
the court has declared that one of fiduciary 
duties owed by directors is to act bona 
fide (in good faith) for the benefit of the 
company as a whole. The meaning of ‘the 
benefit of the company as a whole’ however, 
is far from clear. In the early of the 20th 
century, the court declared that the director 
owed a duty to his company alone and owed 
no duty to anyone else.28 Several years 
later, the court took a different approach by 
declaring that the interest of the company 
as a whole simply meant the interest of 
the company’s shareholders,29 both present 
shareholders and future shareholders.30 A 
significant change of this rule had been 
developed when the court held that the 
interests of creditors were paramount over 
those of shareholders if the solvency of 
the company was in state of doubtful.31 
Nevertheless the interest of employees is 
still set aside.
In the case of Parke v. Daily News 
Ltd,32 where a shareholder challenged the 
company’s policy to give the whole purchase 
price of its newspaper for the redundant 
employee’s benefit, the court rejected a 
proposition that the board of directors must 
take into consideration its duties to emplo-
yees as a proposition of law.33 The court 
upheld the rule in Greenhalgh v. Arderne 
Cinemas Ltd.34 that the benefit of the 
company meant the benefit of shareholders 
as a general body.
In the United Kingdom, this rule has 
been overruled by the Companies Act 1985 
which mandates that company directors 
shall include the interest of employees in 
their decision making.35 Similarly, in New 
Zealand, the Companies Act 1993 has 
adopted the approach that the interest of 
employees may be taken into account by 
directors in administering the company.36 
Under Australian law, however, there is no 
case law or corporation legislation which 
obliges directors to take into account the 
interest of employees in their decisions for 
the company.37 Despite that, a company 
is bound by laws on conditions of labour 
which provide several protections to the 
interests of employees.38 Directors, there-
fore will be in breach of their fiduciary duty 
to the company if they fail to consider the 
employees’ interest as regulated by those 
28 Percival v. Wright (1902) 2 Ch 421.
29 Greehalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd. (1951) Ch.286; Ngurli Ltd. v. McCann (1953) 90 CLR 425.
30  Gaiman v. National Association for Mental Health (1971) Ch. 317.
31  Walker v. Wimbrone (1976) 137 CLR 1; Kinsela v. Russell Kinsela Pty Ltd. (in liq) (1986) 4 ACLC 215.
32  Parke v. Daily News Ltd (1962) Ch. 927.
33 Ibid.
34  Greenhalgh v. Arderne Cinemas Ltd (1951) Ch. 286.
35  Andrea Corfield, “The Stakeholder Theory and its Future in Australian Corporate Governance: A Preliminary 
Analysis”, Bond Law Review, Vol. 10, 2, 1998, p. 213.
36  H. A. J. Ford and R. P. Austin, 2010, Ford and Austin’s Principles of Corporations Law, 14 ed.,  Butterworths, 
Sydney, p. 265.
37 Ibid.
38  Ibid.
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laws. Accordingly, in discussing directors’ 
duty to the company’s employees, it is 
necessary to analyse how far labour law 
requires an employer, in this case a company 
via its directors, considers the interest of its 
employees in its business decisions.
The Workplace Relations Act 1996, 
as amended by the Workplace Relations 
Amendment Act 2005 provides several 
protections to the interests of employees, 
as the act adopts international labour 
standards. For example, the Act requires 
that employers provide employees with 
five minimum entitlements, which covered 
maximum ordinary working hours, annual 
leave, parental leave, personal/carer’s 
leave and minimum pay scales. These five 
minimum entitlements were referred to 
as the Australian Fair Pay and Conditions 
Standard.39 However, in response to wide-
spread criticism, the government introduced 
a Fairness Test to replace the Australian Fair 
Pay and Conditions Standard which came 
into effect on 7 May 2007.
When an employer decides to terminate 
an employee’s employment because of the 
company’s genuine operational reasons, it 
must give an appropriate notice of termina-
tion to that employee.40 Compensation 
instead of notice may be given. When 
termination is taking place on account of 
the employee’s conduct or performance, 
the employee must be given an opportunity 
to defend himself against the allegations. 
An employee’s employment cannot be 
terminated by an employer unless there is 
a valid reason or reasons, connected with 
either the employee’s conduct or capacity, 
or the operational requirements of the under 
taking, establishment or service. A reason 
is not valid if the termination is harsh, unjust 
or unreasonable.41 An employer is prohibited 
to terminate employment on the grounds:42
a. discriminatory reasons such as age, 
race, national extraction, political 
opinion, sex, sexual preference, reli-
gion, marital status, disability, preg-
nancy and family responsibilities;
b. refusal to sign an Australian Work-
place Agreement (AWA);
c. being involved in proceedings against 
an employer for alleged breach of the 
law;
d. membership or non-membership of 
a union or participation in union 
activities; and 
e. absence from work due to illness or 
injury, parental leave or emergency 
management activities.
Whenever an employer terminates 15 
or more employees because of economic, 
technological, structural or similar 
reasons, the employer must notify a body 
prescribed by the Workplace Relations 
Regulations 200643 (currently the said body 
is Centrelink44) in writing of the intended 
termination explaining the reasons of 
termination, the numbers and categories of 
employees likely to be affected, and the time 
over which the employer intends to carry out 
39  Colin Fenwick, “How Low Can You Go? Minimum Working Conditions Under Australia’s New Labour Laws”, 
The Economic and Labour Relation Review, Vol. 16, 2, 2006.
40 Section 661.
41  Section 652 (1)b.
42  Section 659.
43  Section 660.
44 Regulation 12.9, Workplace Relations Regulations 2006.
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the termination.45 The Australian Industrial 
Relations Court can impose a penalty to 
an employer of no more than $1000 for 
contravention of this provision and order 
the employer not to terminate the 
employment of employees pursuant to the 
decision, except as permitted by the order.46 
The employer must also notify a union of 
the proposed termination and to consult 
with the union as to whether the impact of 
the redundancies could be mitigated.47
Despite these employee’s interest 
protections, it is apparent that these 
provisions do not impose the company 
via its directors to consider the interest of 
employees in its business decision as a part 
of the interest of the company as a whole. 
In other words, employees are treated as the 
outsider of the company. When the company 
decides to terminate 15 or more emplo-
yees because of economic, technological, 
structural or similar reasons, the company 
is under obligation to notify the Centre- 
link and the union as well. However, it 
should be noted that the obligation comes 
along after the company made the decision, 
and both the Centrelink and the union cannot 
change that decision. The Act does not 
regulate that in making a business decision, 
the company must consider the interest of 
employees. It ignores any consideration 
applied behind the decision. Although 
the company must mention the reasons of 
termination when it notifies the Centrelink, 
there is no power given to the Centrelink 
to reject the reasons. For these circum-
stances, it can be understood that labour law 
does not deal with corporate governance, 
even less any business judgments. One of 
its aims is to protect employees who are 
in the vulnerable position against the 
employer. Corporate governance is a matter 
of corporate law, so that corporate law is 
always relevant to promote the interest of 
employees.
2.  Practical approach
Although corporate laws in Indonesia 
and Australia are still uncertain in dealing 
with this issue, in reality, every successful 
company accepts, either explicitly or 
implicitly, that it has an obligation to pay 
due regard to the interest of its employees.48 
However, in the absence of statutory 
obligation, it is doubted whether employees 
can demand their interests to be considered 
in directors’ decision. By supposing the 
reversed fact in the American case of 
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co,49 where 
Ford declared that it would not give its 
employees any pay rise or bonus because 
it preferred to pay extravagant dividends 
to its shareholders, the enforcement of 
the duty owed by directors to pay due 
regard to the employees’ interest is doubtful, 
since there is no mechanism for doing so 
45  Section 660.
46 Ibid.
47  Ibid.
48 Allan Lowrie Mackenzie, “The Employee and the Company Director”, New Law Journal, July, 1982, p. 689.
49 Dodge v. Ford Motor Co (1919) 170 NW 668. In this case, Ford sought to end special dividends for shareholders 
in favor of massive investments in new plants that would enable Ford to dramatically grow the output of 
production, and numbers of people employed at his plants, while continuing to cut the costs and prices of his 
cars.
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provided by corporate law or any branch of 
the law.50 
For the above circumstances, some 
people suggest that employees or trade 
unions should be given a few shares so that 
they become qualified to take an action, 
‘either qua member to have the company 
observe their rules of company law and 
the terms of the corporate constitution, 
or in derivative form as representing the 
company’.51 Nevertheless, taking an action 
qua member is inconsistent with the rule that 
a personal action can be exercised to enforce 
rights enjoyed in the capacity as a member, 
not rights enjoyed in any other capacity.52 
When employees become members, 
therefore, they are entitled to take an action 
qua members to enforce their member rights 
only, not their employee rights. Thus, an 
employee share ownership is not an effective 
mechanism for an employee to demand her 
or his rights to be considered.
In spite of this ineffectiveness, an 
employee share ownership plan (ESOP) 
is acknowledged as a way to have regards 
the interest of employees, and has been 
popular in Australia’s largest companies.53 
An ESOP is a scheme whereby shares are 
offered for subscription or purchase only 
to any or all full or part-time employees of 
the issuing corporation. The main types of 
ESOPs currently in operation in Australia 
are Fully Paid Share Plan with Company 
Loans, Partly Paid Share Plan, Option Plan, 
Employee Share Acquisition Plan (ESAP), 
Executive Share Unit Trust (ESUT), and 
Share Replicator Plan.54
In Indonesia, since 1990s some com-
panies have exercised ESOPs in order to 
adjust the new phase in Indonesia and to get 
more commitment from their employees.55 
As there is no regulation on ESOPs, the 
arrangement and the number of shares 
purported differ from one company to 
others.56 In the absence of law on this issue, 
no one can impose companies in Indonesia 
to exercise ESOP as a mechanism for 
promoting the interests of employees.
ESOPs are essential to bridge the 
gap between capital and labour in modern 
society. Generally speaking, their objectives 
are to establish a foundation for the creation 
of a true partnership between owners 
and employees, to enhance employee 
performance and motivation to increase 
productivity, to overcome a fairly common 
cynical attitude of employees towards 
workplace organisation initiatives designed 
to facilitate participation, and to establish 
a remuneration structure which will 
complement and reinforce the company’s 
strategic business plans.57
50 L.S. Sealy, “Directors’ “Wider” Responsibilities - Problems Conceptual, Practical and Procedural”, Monash 
Law Review, Vol. 13, 1997, p. 164.
51 Ibid., p. 184.
52  Hickman v. Kent or Romney Marsh Sheep-Breeders’ Association, (1915) 1 Ch. 881
53  Ann O’connell, “Employee Share Ownership Plans in Australia: the Taxation Law Framework”, Journal of the 
Australasian Tax Teachers Association, Vol. 3, 1, 2008, p. 36.
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For employees, the plans give several 
advantages. They deliver the full value 
of dividends when declared and offer the 
opportunity to make periodic sales of shares 
to realise capital gain.58 Nevertheless, they 
also have a risk of large losses when the share 
price falls. Because of the risk, some people 
suggest that an employee should not ‘put 
all his eggs in one basket’, he ‘should not 
be investing in the firm where he works’.59 
For this objection, it can be argued that ‘the 
way to make money is to put all your eggs in 
one basket and watch the basket’, and that, 
the plans are ‘the icing on the cake, not the 
whole cake’.60
Another reason to reject the plans is 
that when an employee wants to own shares, 
he can save up and buy them in the stock 
market. For this reason, it can be argued 
that a stock market is not ‘a share shop for 
small first-time buyers’, but it is a place 
where people who have built up a business 
spread their risks by exchanging some of 
their shares for other securities. Besides 
that, there is a psychological barrier to buy 
shares on a stock market for any first-time 
investors, especially an unsophisticated 
employee, in which, this barrier can be 
crossed by introducing shareholding via an 
employee share ownership plan.61
3. the Formal recognition of employees
Indonesian and Australian corporate 
laws are examples of the shareholder-
focused model of corporate governance. 
As pointed out by Professor Berle, this 
model requires profit maximisation for 
shareholders to be the guiding principle 
for directors. This means, shareholders are 
the one and only shareholder group that 
directors should take into account when 
making a decision. Under this model, the role 
of employees in the corporate governance 
framework may not be formally recognised 
in statute and in other formal sources of 
law.
In contrast, the stakeholder-focused 
model of corporate governance asserted 
by Professor Dodd requires company 
directors to be guardians of all the interests 
whom the corporation affects – such as 
employees, creditors and consumers – and 
not merely to be servants of its shareholders. 
This model stresses the importance of 
employee participation in the corporate 
governance and employees may be for- 
mally recognised and accepted as integral 
players in the corporate governance 
arrangement.62
The stakeholder-focused model is 
best recognised in German corporate 
law.63 As a civil law country, Germany 
adopts a two-tier board structure, which 
are the management board (Vorstand) and 
the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat).64 
The Vorstand holds all managerial 
58  Ibid., p. 21.
59  G.R. Cyriax, 1981, Planning Employee Share Schemes, Gower Publishing Co. Ltd., Aldershot, Hants, England, p. 3.
60 Ibid.
61 Ibid.
62  Andrew Clarke, 2005, Op.cit., p. 3.
63 Katharine V. Jackson, “Towards A Stakeholder-Shareholder Theory of Corporate Governance: A Comparative 
Analysis”, Hastings Business Law Journal, Vol. 7, 2001, p. 353.
64  Patrick C. Leyens, “German Company Law: Recent Developments and Future Challenges”, German Law 
Journal, Vol. 6, 10, 2005, p. 1411.
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powers65 whilst the Aufsichtsrat performs 
the ‘watch-dog function’.66 The German 
corporate law requires employee repre-
sentation on the Aufsichtsrat. Thus, the 
Aufsichtsrat consists of shareholders and 
employee representatives.67 The Aufsichtsrat 
has power to appoint to the Vorstand.68 
Likewise, the Vorstand is required to have 
one employee representative (Arbeits-
direktor).69 The employee representatives 
in the Aufsichtsrat and the Vorstand is 
called co-determination (Mitbestimmung), 
that is the right to participate in decision 
making.70
The employee representatives in 
the Aufsichtsrat and the Vorstand are fed 
a wealth of information by the Works 
Council (Betriebsrat) in order to be able to 
become informed participants in company 
discussions. The Works Council comprises 
members elected from the workforce. Its 
size depends on the size of the company to 
which it is attached. It deals with any matter 
relating to the conditions of employment 
of employees of the company including 
hours, overtime and remuneration. Em-
ployee issues that are within the domain of 
the trade unions are left to the unions. The 
role of the Works Council and trade unions 
are different. The ideology of the Works 
Council is the belief that employees 
are interested in the long-term view of 
business and are, to a large extent, uncon-
cerned by dividends to shareholders.71
4.  Incorporating the Formal recog-
nition of employees into Indonesian 
corporate Governance
The non-recognition of employees’ 
roles in the corporate governance as adopted 
by Indonesian corporate law represents a 
traditional view of the corporate doctrine. 
Modern corporate governance recognises 
the roles played by employees and 
accounts for the interest of employees. 
It also requires directors to pay attention 
to the needs and collective welfare of the 
employee group. As noted by Professor 
Dodd, that “there is a widespread and 
growing feeling that industry owes to its 
employees not merely the negative duties 
of refraining from overworking or injuring 
them, but the affirmative duty of providing 
them so far as possible with economic 
security.“72
Some scholars strongly suggest that 
“no corporation can sustain itself without 
appropriate attention to all those who hold 
a stake in its performance - customers 
certainly, but also suppliers, creditors, neigh-
bours, society in general and, of course, 
those most directly affected – employees 
[…] There is a growing sense that rank 
and file employee, as well as middle-level 
65 Article 76 of the Stock Corporations Act (Aktiengesetz).
66 Article 111 of the Stock Corporations Act.
67  Article 96 of the Stock Corporations Act.
68 Article 84 of the Stock Corporations Act.
69  Article 76 (2) of the Stock Corporations Act.
70 Katharine V. Jackson, 2001, Op.cit., p. 368. Tom C. Hodge, “The Treatment of Employees As Stakeholders In 
The European Union: Current And Future Trends”, Syracuse Journal of International Law and Commerce, Vol. 
38, 2010, pp. 116-117.
71  Patrick C. Leyens, 2005, Loc.cit.
72 E. Merrick Dodd, 1932, Op.cit., p. 1151.
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management, disproportionately share 
the risk, but not the gains of corporate 
success.”73
In recent times promoting the interest 
of employees is not merely the concern of 
labour law but the concern of corporate 
law as well. The American, English and 
New Zealand corporate laws provide that 
directors, in considering the best interests 
of the corporation in discharging their 
duties, are permitted to consider the interests 
of shareholders, employees, suppliers, cus-
tomers, creditors and communities. German 
corporate law obliges large corporations to 
accommodate employee representatives in 
the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). Thus it 
is the time for Indonesian corporate law to 
shift its traditional concept of a corporation 
to the modern one by recognising the role 
of employees in the corporate governance 
formally.
There are three mechanisms can be 
employed by the UUPT in incorporating 
employee’s role in the corporate governance. 
First, imposing a duty on directors to take 
into consideration the interest of employees 
in their business decisions, as have been 
done by American, English and New 
Zealand corporate laws. Second, requiring 
employee representatives to participate 
in the decision making on the boards of 
commissioners and of directors as has 
been done by German corporate law. 
Third, mandating large corporations in 
certain circumstances to purport share for 
their employees (ESOPs). Through these 
mechanisms the interest of employees will 
be better protected and in the long run the 
company will benefit from this system as 
well, since this system will decrease disputes 
and strikes, and consequently will increase 
productivity.
5.  controversial Issues
Some controversial issues arise when 
the interest of employees is incorporated 
within the meaning of the benefit of 
the company as a whole. It is argued that 
requiring directors to take into account the 
interest of shareholders and the interest of 
employees altogether will lead to potential 
conflicts since often, the objectives of the 
two groups are in opposition, or do not 
coincide.74 For example, where a company 
is in financial difficulties, the directors 
will have to choose between protecting 
shareholders by making some employees 
redundant, or protecting the employees at 
the expense of shareholders, which is by 
reducing the amount of dividends paid to 
shareholders.
It is stated that such a situation will 
put directors in an impossible situation 
since one interest will inevitably be 
paramount,75 while if directors consider the 
interests of one and disregard those of the 
other, they will be in breach of their duties. 
However, it can be argued that directors’ 
function is to balance a number of different 
interests in reaching the decisions which 
they are obliged to make to be in the 
company’s best overall interests. In this case, 
73 R. J. Mahoney, “Business Should Act for All Its Stakeholders – Before ‘The Feds’ Do”.
74 Allan Lowrie Mackenzie, 1982, Op.cit., p. 689.
75 Ibid.
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directors can compromise those different 
interests, for example by paying sizable 
premiums to older and to foreign employees 
if they agree to retire before their time or to 
return to their home countries.76
Another issue is that every director’s 
decision will potentially be a subject for 
judicial review whenever there is one group 
who feels its interests are disregarded. Such 
a situation has been pointed out by Berle 
when he commented Dodd’s proposition 
that company law should regard the trustee-
ship of corporate managers as extending 
to embrace the interests of employees, 
customers and others.77 Berle asserted 
that this proposition would create legal 
difficulties and would make the proposal 
unpractical.78 “The only thing that can come 
out of it, in any long view, is the massing 
of group after group to assert their private 
claims by force or threat [...]. This is an 
invitation not to law or orderly government, 
but to a process of economic civil war.”79
Such a fear, however, cannot be 
justified since corporate law does not allow 
shareholders, by majority vote or unani-
mous consent to overrule or interfere with 
directors’ decisions made in lawful in 
exercising managerial powers. There is a 
clear separation between ownership and 
management in the corporation. Corporate 
law also does not give any power to 
shareholders to pass advisory resolutions. 
Besides that, there is a business judgment 
rule, whereby the courts are reluctant ‘to 
review business judgments of directors and 
to give their own judgments on the merits 
unless specifically required by statute’.80 
This rule is an American rule but it is widely 
recognised by corporate laws in other 
jurisdictions.
On the other hand, many obstacles exist 
to discourage and impede actions brought 
by employees against directors. Primarily, 
labour law encourages the employer, in 
this case the company, and the employees 
to settle their dispute in an agreement at 
the workplace or enterprise level. The 
Industrial Relations Court is to prevent and 
settle industrial disputes by mediation or 
arbitration and to encourage the parties to 
fulfil the agreed procedures for preventing 
and settling industrial disputes.
Moreover, there are difficulties in 
obtaining legal aid. If a trade union is to 
pursue the case on behalf of its members, 
its lawyers will have to be assured that 
there are good reasons for going to law.81 
Trade union lawyers surely will be averse 
towards having costs awarded against their 
union and will surely prefer to spend their 
time advising on ways of avoiding litiga-
tion.82 Then, in the case that the company 
decides some of its employees to be made 
redundant because of its financial difficul-
ties, their union will not take any action 
76 Friedrich K. Kübler, “Dual Loyalty of Labour Representatives”, in Hopt and Teubner (eds.), 1985, Corporate 
Governance and Directors’ Liabilities, Walter de Gruyter, Berlin, p. 432.
77 E. Merrick Dodd, 1932, Loc.cit.
78 Adolf A. Berle, 1932, Loc.cit.
79  Ibid.
80 H. A. J. Ford and R. P. Austin, 2010, Op.cit., p. 257.
81 Allan Lowrie Mackenzie, 1982, Loc.cit.
82  Ibid.
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against that decision when they realise that 
the decision made in order to preserve the 
remaining jobs and hope for revitalisation 
as a result.83 This is preferable than avoiding 
redundancy which can lead the company 
into liquidation, which means, all employees 
will lose their jobs. Thus, it is unlikely that 
employees bring actions against directors 
whenever their interests are set aside.
c.  conclusion
To sum up, the legal rule which has 
been developed and applied in Indonesia 
is that company directors owe a duty 
to exercise their powers and discharge 
their duties in good faith and with full 
responsibility in the interests and business 
of the company, in which the meaning of 
the interest of the company is merely the 
interest of shareholders. The interest of 
employees is not within the meaning of the 
interest of the company. This rule represents 
a traditional and narrow conception of the 
corporation; accordingly, it needs to be 
reformed. Although Indonesia has ratified 
numerous ILO conventions, these reforms 
have not translated into concrete protections 
in practice. Indonesian directors, therefore, 
should be imposed a duty to the company to 
take into account the interest of employees 
in their business decisions, as have been 
done by other countries.
The absence of positive law gives rise 
difficulties in enforcing the duty since there 
is no mechanism available to do so. It is true 
that labour law has provided mechanisms to 
protect the interests of employees, but it is 
less severe to impose directors to consider 
the interest of employees in their decision 
making. Accordingly, it is necessary for 
Indonesian company law or UUPT to declare 
that directors in considering the best interest 
of the corporation in discharging their duties 
are obliged to consider the effect of any 
decision upon all groups affected by such 
decision, including shareholders, employees, 
creditors, customers and communities where 
its office is located.
83 Ibid.
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